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Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market
for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking
Abstract
We study liquidity transfers between banks through the interbank borrowing
and asset sale markets when (i) surplus banks providing liquidity have market
power, (ii) there are frictions in the lending market due to moral hazard,
and (iii) assets are bank-specic. We show that when the outside options of
needy banks are weak, surplus banks may strategically under-provide lending,
thereby inducing ine¢ cient sales of bank-specic assets. A central bank can
ameliorate this ine¢ ciency by standing ready to lend to needy banks, provided
it has greater information about banks (e.g., through supervision) compared
to outside markets, or is prepared to extend potentially loss-making loans.
The public provision of liquidity to banks, in fact its mere credibility, can thus
improve the private allocation of liquidity among banks. This rationale for
central banking nds support in historical episodes preceding the modern era
of central banking and has implications for recent debates on the supervisory
and lender-of-last-resort roles of central banks.
JEL classication: G21, G28, G38, E58, D62.
Keywords: Competition, Interbank lending, Market power, Asset specicity,
Central bank, Lender of last resort.
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1 Introduction
The liquidity squeeze during the ongoing crisis of 2007-09 has been likened by some ob-
servers, including the IMF, to the nancial sector turmoil of the Depression era. A nagging
problem faced by central banks during the early part of this crisis was the di¢ culty in get-
ting open-market operations, discount window and securities lending to channel liquidity
to the most needy parts of the nancial system. Some of the lending facilities such as the
discount window were not availed by players, and others when availed merely resulted in
hoarding of liquidity by banks and other institutions. For example, Acharya and Mer-
rouche (2009) document, for example, that the U.K. banksliquidity bu¤ers experienced
an almost permanent upward shift of 30% in August 2007 (relative to their pre-August
levels) and the result was a rise in borrowing costs between banks and an almost com-
plete drying up of liquidity in interbank markets beyond the very short maturities.1 In
response, central banks around the world, most notably the Federal Reserve, undertook
signicant changes to their lender-of-last-resort facilities, in particular, by extending ma-
turities of discount window and open-market operations, extending eligible collateral to
include investment-grade debt securities, and making such adjustments for lending to
primary dealers as well.
The episode begs several important questions: Why have the interbank markets, which
in normal times act as lubricant to nancial ows amongst banks, dried up so suddenly?
Why have the traditional forms of central banks lender-of-last-resort facilities failed to
allocate liquidity to places needing it most? Indeed, going forward, how should central
banks provide these facilities for them to be e¤ective during crises? Do limits to the pre-
cision of supervisory information about banks compromise central bankse¤ectiveness in
overcoming the failure of interbank markets? Our paper attempts to provide a theoretical
answer some of these questions based on a specic market failure stemming from market
power in liquidity transfers between banks.
We propose that during crises, e¢ cient liquidity transfers may not occur between
surplus and liquidity stricken banks. We analyze one such source of ine¢ ciency arising
from the market power of surplus banks in the market for interbank liquidity transfers
and the strategic gains they derive from buying assets from liquidity stricken banks at
re sale prices and, more generally, gaining market share at their expense. We determine
conditions under which a central bank can mitigate this ine¢ ciency by standing ready to
lend to needy banks. We report historical episodes in support of this rationale for central
banking and discuss implications for recent debates on the supervisory and lender-of-last-
resort functions.
We consider liquidity transfers between a surplus and a needy bank through two
markets: the interbank market and the asset sales market. Our model has three main
ingredients. First, we assume that some assets are bank-specic, i.e., they are worth
more under current than under alternative ownership. For instance, alternative owners
may lack current owners expertise. For this reason, asset sales are less attractive than
borrowing (from a rst-best standpoint). Second, we assume frictions in the interbank
1Source: Hoarding by banks stokes fears over crisis: Borrowing costs rise between institutions; (Cen-
tral Bank) E¤orts on lending fail to bear fruit,Financial Times, 3/26/2008.
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lending market, which we model as arising from a moral hazard problem. Specically,
we assume that banks can monitor their assets to improve their performance, and that
monitoring is costly. A bank borrowing in the interbank market must retain a large
enough claim on its own assets to have incentives to monitor them. This friction limits
banksborrowing capacity so that in the second-best, banks are forced to engage in asset
sales when borrowing needs are su¢ ciently high. Third, we assume that during crises,
liquidity is concentrated within a few banks, giving them market power. It is this last
assumption, and its interaction with other two, that drive the core of our analysis.
We show that the market power of surplus banks can lead to more asset sales, and
importantly, more ine¢ cient asset sales by banks in need of liquidity. The intuition is that
banks with market power in the interbank market can extract rents from banks seeking
liquidity. Given the moral hazard problem, needy banks borrowing capacity is limited
and it must engage in more asset sales to the surplus bank. E¤ectively, the surplus bank
can extract rents either by charging higher interest rate or alternatively by paying less for
the assets. The higher the surplus banks market power, the worse the ine¢ ciency arising
from excessive asset sales.
The surplus banks ability to exploit market power is limited by the outside option
provided by the market, for example, raising liquidity through commercial paper issuance
or raising public debt. Therefore, the problem of ine¢ cient asset sales is more acute the
weaker is the outside market, a scenario that would arise, for instance, in liquidation of
opaque or information-sensitive assets and bank-specic loans made to small borrowers.
The key insight from these results is that due to market power, even states without
aggregate shortage of liquidity are e¤ectively converted into states of aggregate liquidity
shortage.2 We argue that this implies a rationale for the lender-of-last-resort role of a
central bank. A central bank that is credible in providing liquidity to needy banks curbs
the market power of surplus banks in the interbank lending market and thus improves
the e¢ ciency of liquidity transfers. In particular, the central bank can play a virtual
and virtuousrole: In our model, it never actually lends to needy banks in equilibrium,
but merely improves their bargaining position vis-à-vis surplus banks. We show however
that such an improvement requires the central bank to be better than outside markets at
extending loans to needy banks or be ready to incur potential losses. The former situation
is more likely if the central bank also has a supervisory role, allowing it to improve its
ability to monitor its lending to liquidity stricken banks. In particular, the role for ex-ante
investments in supervision does not arise as a way to reduce the incidence of central bank
making loans ex post, but to make such intervention credible and thereby improve the
private allocation of liquidity among banks.
We also study the possibility for banks to insure against liquidity shocks. This possi-
2This may even cause liquidity stricken banks to fail. Outside of our model, this may even lead
to contagion on other banks which look similar to liquidity stricken banks. For example, Goodhart
(1969) discusses the role of such a contagion e¤ect during the 1907 crisis. On October 21, the National
Bank of Commerce refused to clear for the Knickerbocker Trust Company, which precipitated a run on
Knickerbocker. One suggestion is that this move was part of severe competition and a ght for market
share between national banks and trust companies in New York and National Bank of Commerce took
the opportunity to eliminate a rival or a set of rivals since the run on Knickerbocker spilled over onto all
other trust companies.
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bility reduces the ine¢ ciency in interbank liquidity transfers. However, as long as banks
can only get partial liquidity insurance, surplus banksex post market power increases (or
creates) ine¢ ciency in the allocation of liquidity. This leads to several additional results.
First, if banks that are likely to have excess liquidity and market power ex post are also
the best liquidity insurers ex ante, their market power reduces the scope for liquidity
insurance. Put simply, committing to provide liquidity insurance conicts with incentives
to retain and exploit market power. Second, committing to provide liquidity insurance is
costly for banks as they may potentially require liquidity in future too. Thus, if states
with aggregate shortage of liquidity are more likely, then it is more costly for banks to
provide liquidity insurance, resulting in lower levels of ex-ante insurance. This, in turn,
increases the ex-post market power of liquidity rich banks even in states without any
aggregate liquidity shortage.
These results imply that ex-ante provision of liquidity insurance is likely to be incom-
plete, as observed in practice, and market power considerations arise in a robust manner
when liquidity distribution across banks is highly skewed.3
To summarize, our model illustrates that the public provision of liquidity, in fact, its
mere credibility, can improve its private provision even in times of aggregate liquidity sur-
plus. This lender-of-last-resort rationale for the existence of a central bank complements
the traditional one pertaining to times of aggregate liquidity shortages and contagious
failures (e.g., Allen and Gale (1998), Holmström and Tirole (1998), Diamond and Rajan
(2005), Gorton and Huang (2006)). Our analysis also claries why central banks should
assume both roles of supervisor and lender-of-last-resort.
We provide historical and current accounts from various countries that support the
notion of market power of cash-rich banks during crises in Appendix B. In particular, we
present evidence on: (i) failure of private coinsurance arrangements such as the Clearing-
house System rst established by the New York City banks in 1853; (ii) the role of J.P.
Morgan and National City Bank, which was to become Citibank, in the 1907 crisis and
how they beneted using market power during the crisis; (iii) the emergence of modern
central banking as public institution concerned with the overall nancial stability of the
system rather than as a competitor to other banks as was the case in early era of central
banking; (iv) the role of central banks in stabilizing markets and interest rates during
crises from Donaldson (1992) that compares interest rates during the pre-Fed (1867-1913)
and post-Fed (1914-1933) periods to show that the establishment of the Federal Reserve
to act as a lender of last resort during panic periods prevented surplus banks from exerting
market power; and (v) market power in non-bank parts of the nancial system such as
the episodes of failure of LTCM in 1998 and Amaranth in 2006.
Our model, while not reecting all aspects of inter-bank markets, is aimed at captur-
3Other reasons for liquidity insurance to be only partial include the impossibility to enter binding
long-term contracts, the fragility of implicit contracts in crises situations, or the possibility of aggregate
liquidity shortage combined with liquid bankscost of capital being non-veriable. For instance, banks
could enter implicit contracts for liquidity provision, sustained through reputation and repeated interac-
tions. This may however also be less relevant during crises. Indeed, Carlin, Lobo and Viswanathan (2007)
show that such contracts break down when the preyis large or close to default since the continuation
of a relationship is less valuable. Crises may represent exactly such situations.
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ing the market power issues arising due to tiering and relationships, even present in
todays over-the-counter interbank markets. It is our understanding that even in large
interbank markets such as those in the US and the UK, issues of market power and con-
centration remain important. For example, in the US, the Fed Funds market is a tiered
and concentrated market, where two banks, JPMC and Bank of America, are very big
borrowers with a huge di¤erence in volume from the rest of the banks, and two banks,
State Street and JPMC, are big lenders, again with a huge di¤erence in volume from the
rest. Furthermore, a signicant proportion of banks have connections with only one or
two banks, where the average number of connections is only somewhere between three and
four, which is low when we take into account of the fact that only a few banks are involved
in most of inter-bank connections (see Bech and Atalay (2008)). The UK too has a tiered
banking system and the volatility induced in inter-bank lending rates due to cornering of
collateral and liquidity by some of the large settlement banks during 2001-2005 was one
of the primary rationales for the Money Market Reform in 2006. Post-Reform, the Bank
of England allowed more banks in open market operations increasing the number from 10
to more than 35 (see Bank of England (2005) and Tucker (2004)). Finally, Cocco et. al.
(2005) provide evidence supportive of strong inter-bank relationships in the Portuguese
inter-bank market. This microstructure suggests that outcomes in interbank markets
are unlikely to be of the competitive type, especially during crises when distribution of
liquidity tends to be asymmetric and concentrated in hands of few players.
Related literature Our paper is related to the literature on the failure of interbank
markets that justies the lender-of-last-resort role of central banks.4 Goodfriend and
King (1988) argue that with e¢ cient interbank markets, central banks should not lend to
individual banks but instead provide su¢ cient liquidity via open market operations, which
the interbank market would then allocate e¢ ciently among banks. Others however, argue
that interbank markets may fail to allocate liquidity e¢ ciently due to frictions such as
asymmetric information about banksassets (Flannery (1996), Freixas and Jorge (2007)),
banks free-riding on each others liquidity (Bhattacharya and Gale (1987)), or on the
central banks liquidity (Repullo (2005)). Instead, our paper focuses on the (additional)
frictions brought about by market power.5
Donaldson (1992) is, to our knowledge, the only paper with a similar focus. Using
Dunn and Spatt (1984)s strategic pricing model, it shows that even if aggregate liquidity
is in surplus, if some banks have a signicant proportion of the excess cash so that other
cash rich banksresources are not enough to satisfy the total liquidity demand, banks can
exploit this captive demand and charge higher than competitive rates.
4Indirectly, therefore, our model is also related to the literature justifying the existence of interbank
markets in the rst place, specically their role in allowing banks to insure each other against liquidity
shocks through borrowing and lending facilities (e.g. Rochet and Tirole (1996), Allen and Gale (2000)).
5Appendix B reports historical evidence of such cash hoarding. Casual empiricism suggests that such
cases are not uncommon in recent times either. Our private communications with bankers suggest that
one of the perceived reasons for interbank markets drying up during the recent sub-prime crisis of 2007-09
was the hoarding of liquidity by banks for acquisitions of troubled institutions at re-sale prices, the other
two reasons being a precautionary motive from the risk of being distressed and asymmetric information
about borrowing institutions.
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While some theory papers study the reallocation of funds (e.g. Holmström and Tirole
(1998)) and others that of assets (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Gorton and Huang
(2002)), ours studies both and illustrates the trade-o¤s involved. We believe banksdual
role as each others nanciers and business competitors to be an important and specic
aspect of their relationships.6
Our paper is also related to the literature on predation, i.e., when rivals take actions
that weakens a rms access to nance (Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Cestone (2000)).
Here, however, the dual relationship between banks means that the predator is also the
preys nancier.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents its
analysis. Section 4 discusses the e¤ect of the banksloan portfolio characteristics. Section
5 presents the rationale for central banking. Section 6 deals with liquidity insurance and
its limits. Section 7 discusses robustness issues and Section 8 presents policy implications.
Section 9 concludes. Proofs and a detailed discussion of historical evidence in support of
market power in inter-bank markets and other settings with nancial institutions are in
the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider a model with three dates t = 0; 1; 2, two banks, Bank A and Bank B, universal
risk neutrality and no discounting.7 The timeline of the model is illustrated in Figure 1.
At t = 0, Bank A has a continuum of measure 1 of risky assets, e.g., loans to the
corporate sector. At t = 2, each loan yields a random return eR 2 f0; Rg which depends
on whether the loan was monitored and on an unobservable state of nature ! uniformly
distributed over [0; 1].
At t = 1, each loan needs some renancing of  units of cash, e.g., rolling over of an
existing loan or a drawdown on a line of credit.8 If a loan is not renanced, eR = 0. If it is
renanced, eR = R if ! 2 [0; p] and eR = 0 otherwise. The bank can a¤ect the probability p
by monitoring its loans at t = 1: p = pH if it monitors, and p = pL = (pH  p) otherwise,
with p > 0. Monitoring is non-veriable and the bank enjoys a private benet b per
6While Bear Stearns is formally not a bank, its sale to J.P.Morgan Chase, in March 2008, illustrates
well the conuence of (J.P.Morgan Chases) roles as lender and asset purchaser. During the liquidity crisis
at Bear Stearns and its subsequent resolution, J.P.Morgan Chase explicitly stated its strong interest in
Bear Stearnsprime brokerage business. While there were systemic-risk concerns about Bear Stearns
possible collapse, which are outside the scope of current paper, it is interesting to note that J.P.Morgan
Chase does seem to have made the acquisition at a re-sale price: On 3/13/2008, Bear Stearnsstock price
was $57, J.P.Morgan Chase agreed to acquire Bear Stearns on 3/17/2008 at $6 a share with a guarantee
of $30 billion from the Fed to fund Bears less liquid assets such as mortgage-backs; J.P.Morgan Chases
stock went up 10% on 3/17/2008, whereas most other nancial stocks lost value; nally, the deal was
revised and J.P.Morgan Chase agreed to increase the purchase price to $10 a share and to bear the rst
$1 billion of loss that may arise from the loan provided by the Fed.
7The model builds on Holmström and Tirole (1998).
8Alternatively, in a model with liability structure of banks, the liquidity need could stem from depositor
withdrawals or the banks inability to rollover unsecured funding such as short-term commercial paper.
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loan it does not monitor. If the loan is not renanced, the bank derives no private benet
either. We assume it is e¢ cient to renance a loan only if it is monitored, i.e.,
pHR >  > pLR + b: (1)
We assume Bank B has enough excess liquidity to renance Bank As loans. This
assumes implicitly that banks that form interbank lending relationships have imperfectly
correlated liquidity shocks.9
The liquidity transfer can occur in two ways: Bank A can borrow from Bank B or sell
it some of its loans.
Borrowing: Due to limited liability, moral hazard in monitoring limits Bank As bor-
rowing capacity. Indeed, an interbank loan is a transfer L from Bank B to Bank A against
a repayment r if eR = R and 0 if eR = 0.10 Bank A chooses to monitor its loans only if:
p (R  r)  b: (2)
For this incentive compatibility constraint to hold, the repayment r must be small enough,
i.e.,
r  (R Rb) with Rb  b=p: (3)
Bank As borrowing capacity conditional on monitoring, i.e., the maximum funding it can
raise against each loan while retaining monitoring incentives is therefore
pH (R Rb) : (4)
Asset sales: Each loan can be sold to Bank B at a price P . We assume Bank A to
be the most e¢ cient user of its assets, i.e., they are Bank A-specic. This may stem
from expertise or learning-by-doing e¤ects for making and administering loans or from
customer relationships.11 Moreover, Bank As advantage over Bank B may vary across
loans. For instance, smaller loans, or loans relying more on Bank As relationship with the
borrower may be more di¢ cult for Bank B to take over. The relevant loan characteristic
is captured by a variable  distributed over [0; 1] according to the cumulative distribution
function (c.d.f.) F . Loans with smaller values of  are less redeployable to Bank B.
Nevertheless, we assume it is e¢ cient to renance loans even if owned by Bank B. If
Bank B owns a loan of Bank A with characteristic , then p = pB() with
pH > pB() > =R and

dpB()
d

> 0: (5)
9Cocco et.al. (2005) provide supporting evidence that (Portuguese) banks with more volatile liquidity
shocks rely more on lending relationships and borrow from banks with less volatile and less correlated
liquidity shocks.
10Note that with two possible cash ows, one being zero, the distinction between debt and equity is
immaterial.
11If banks forming interbank lending relationships are in di¤erent businesses or have relationship,
information-sensitive loans this assumption is natural. Empirically, DellArricia, Detragiache and Rajan
(2008) and Krozner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007) show that nancially dependent sectors perform rel-
atively worse during banking crises, which is consistent with the importance of bank relationships and
information-sensitive loans.
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With bank-specic assets, asset sales are less e¢ cient than borrowing, conditional on
monitoring.12 However, we assume that moral hazard in monitoring is severe enough (i.e.,
b large) so that Bank A can raise more funds by selling a loan than by pledging some of
its return. Our results are largely unchanged if pB ()R >  and pB ()R > pH (R Rb)
held only for some loans.
Assumption 1 For all  2 [0; 1], pB()R > pH(R Rb).
We model the banksinteraction in the interbank lending and the asset markets as a
two-stage bargaining game of alternating o¤ers with risk of breakdown.13 The game tree
for the bargaining game is illustrated in Figure 2. First, Bank B makes Bank A an o¤er
with three components: A subset of measure  of Bank As assets to be acquired by Bank
B, a repayment r  (1  )R from Bank A to Bank B per unit of asset when eR = R, and
a transfer T from Bank B to Bank A. This transfer corresponds to an average price P per
unit of asset sold and a loan L per unit of asset retained, i.e., T = P + (1  )L. Note
that for a given T , the split between P and L is generally indeterminate: A transfer T
can be obtained through a variety of combinations of asset-sale price and amount lent as
Bank B can earn rents, either by acquiring assets at re-sale prices or charging a hair-cut
while lending to Bank A.
If Bank A accepts the o¤er, it is implemented and bargaining is over. If it rejects
the o¤er then, with probability , bargaining breaks down and each bank receives its
exogenous outside option: Xi  0, for i = A;B (see Section 4 for more details). With
probability (1  ), however, bargaining continues and Bank A gets to make Bank B an
o¤er. If Bank B accepts the o¤er, it is implemented. Otherwise, bargaining breaks down
and each bank receives its outside option.
Two observations are in order. First, the model nests the case of perfect competition,
i.e.,  = 0. Considering  > 0 allows us to study the e¤ect of Bank Bs outside option.
Second, unlike the typical alternating-o¤ers bargaining game of Rubinstein (1982), the
surplus to be shared is a¤ected by how it is shared due to specicity of Bank As assets.
Finally, we assume that XA and XB are small enough, i.e., there will always be gains
from trade between the banks. Since Bank Bs ability to make transfers to Bank A is
limited, we assume that trade will be benecial even if Bank A had to sell all of its assets
to Bank B, i.e.,
1Z
0
pB()RdF () > XA +XB + : (6)
12Implicitly, we are assuming that acquiring a bank but leaving its operations unchanged is impossible,
i.e., the ownership change has real e¤ects. For brevity, we use this reduced form rather than providing a
foundation for the e¤ect of ownership.
13Competition in interbank markets has not been studied fully yet, but Cocco et al. (2005) suggest
some banks are more important lenders than others. Some players in the interbank markets may be big
and pivotal even in normal times. Even if there were no market power in normal times, liquidity crises are
often times when the distribution of liquidity is asymmetric and our model is perhaps a best caricature
of such extreme events.
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3 The interbank market for liquidity
We begin by analyzing the perfect competition benchmark and then turn to the case in
which Bank B has market power.
3.1 Perfect competition
Perfect competition corresponds to  = 0, i.e., Bank A always gets to make the nal
take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. Bank As optimal o¤er maximizes its payo¤ subject to Bank
Bs payo¤ being as high as its outside option. It is easily seen that the optimal o¤er
will satisfy three further properties. First, it must satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint (3), i.e., r  (R   Rb). Otherwise Bank A would not monitor its remaining
loans and selling them to Bank B would be more e¢ cient. Second, Bank Bs transfer to
Bank A must be su¢ cient to renance Bank As remaining assets. Otherwise these assets
would be worthless and selling them to Bank B would again be more e¢ cient. Last, Bank
A will sell its most redeployable assets (if any), i.e., all loans with  above a threshold ^.
Therefore Bank As problem can be written as:
max
^;r;T
^R
0
[pH (R  r)  ] dF () + T
s:t: r  (R Rb)
T  F (^)
^R
0
pHrdF () +
1R^

[pB()R  ] dF ()  T  XB:
(7)
Under the optimal o¤er (A; r

A; T

A), Bank A sells a fraction 

A = 1 F (A) of its assets.
Proposition 1 Under perfect competition ( = 0), the outcome is as follows.
 If pH(R   Rb)     XB, the outcome is e¢ cient: Bank As funding needs are
met entirely by borrowing from Bank B and no assets are sold (i.e. A = 0). Bank As
expected payo¤ is
A = pHR  (XB + ) : (8)
 Otherwise, the outcome is ine¢ cient: Bank A sells a fraction A = 1 F (A) of its
assets to Bank B with A dened by
1Z
A
[pB()R  pH(R Rb)] dF () = (XB + )  pH(R Rb); (9)
while the remaining assets are renanced with the sales proceeds and a loan from Bank
B. In that case, Bank As payo¤ is
A = pHR  (XB + ) 
1Z
A
[pH   pB()]RdF (): (10)
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The intuition is as follows. In equilibrium, Bank B must contribute  to nance all
of Bank As assets in place, and enjoy an expected payo¤ XB. Therefore, Bank A must
pledge (XB + ) to Bank B, which it can do by borrowing from Bank B or selling it
assets. Because assets are best managed by Bank A, borrowing is Bank As preferred
source of funds. Therefore if Bank As pledgeable income pH(R   Rb) exceeds (XB + ),
Bank A will meet its entire funding needs by borrowing. In that case, it captures the full
value of its assets, net of Bank Bs outside option (expression (8)). Otherwise, it must sell
some assets to Bank B to nance the shortfall, i.e., expression (9)s RHS. Indeed owning
an asset is more valuable to Bank B than holding a debt claim against it (Assumption
1). Because asset sales are ine¢ cient, Bank A will sell as few assets as needed for the
shortfall to be covered by the increased funding capacity these sales allow, i.e., expression
(9)s LHS. In that case, Bank As payo¤ is curtailed by the ine¢ ciency associated with
asset sales, i.e., expression (10)s last term. The larger the shortfall, the more assets need
to be sold and the more ine¢ cient is the outcome.
3.2 Imperfect competition
Consider now imperfect competition ( > 0). We solve the model by backward induction.
If Bank A gets to make the nal o¤er, the outcome is as in Proposition 1. In the previous
stage, Bank B makes the rst o¤er. When deciding whether to accept the o¤er, Bank
A must consider the possibility that bargaining will break down, which happens with
probability . Hence Bank A will accept an o¤er only if its expected payo¤ is at least
E (A) = XA + (1  )A: (11)
As before, the optimal o¤er satises three further properties: Bank A will sell its most
redeployable assets, i.e., with  above some threshold ^, and set r  (R   Rb) and
T  F (^). Hence, Bank Bs problem can be stated as:
max
^;r;T
^R
0
pHrdF () +
1R^

[pB()R  ] dF ()  T
s:t: r  (R Rb)
T  F (^)
^R
0
[pH (R  r)  ] dF () + T  E (A)
(12)
Under the optimal o¤er (; r; T ), Bank A sells a fraction  = 1  F () of its assets.
Proposition 2 The negotiations outcome is as follows.
 If E (A)  pHRb, the outcome is e¢ cient: Bank As funding needs are met entirely
by borrowing from Bank B and no assets are sold (i.e.  = 0).
 Otherwise, the outcome is ine¢ cient: Bank A sells a fraction  = (1  E (A) =pHRb)
of its assets to Bank B (i.e. all loans with  >  = F 1 (E (A) =pHRb)) while the re-
maining assets are renanced with the sales proceeds and a loan from Bank B.
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Bank B aims to acquire as many of Bank As assets as possible subject to Bank A
getting its reservation payo¤. Indeed, under Assumption 1, a sale is the most e¤ective
way of transferring value from Bank A to Bank B. For instance, for E (A) = 0, Bank
B acquires all of Bank As assets for free, i.e., sets  =  = 1 and T  = 0. As E (A)
increases, Bank B must ensure that Bank A accepts its o¤er. The most e¢ cient way of
increasing Bank As payo¤ is for Bank B to leave it some assets and renance them, i.e.,
T = F (^). Because Bank A is best at managing its assets, this is preferred to Bank B
making a cash transfer to Bank A above the funding needs. In that case, Bank A should
obviously keep its least redeployable assets. For the same reason, maximizing r is always
weakly optimal, i.e., r = (R   Rb). Indeed, leaving Bank A with a stake exceeding Rb
on an asset is akin to a cash transfer. In turn  is determined by Bank As participation
constraint. When E (A) = 0, Bank B acquires all of Bank As assets ( = 1). As
E (A) increases, Bank B must leave Bank A some assets nanced with borrowing with
r = R   Rb. Hence, for each asset, Bank As expected payo¤ is pHRb. Hence  is
determined by (1  ) pHRb = E (A).
3.3 Properties
We now highlight some properties of the outcome. Bank A selling all of its assets with
 >  involves a deadweight loss
K 
1Z

(pH   pB())RdF ():
We begin with the e¤ect of Bank Bs market power on the equilibrium liquidity transfer.
Corollary 1 E¢ ciency (weakly) decreases with Bank Bs market power. More precisely,
 A threshold  2 [0; 1] exists such that the outcome is e¢ cient if and only if  < .
 For  > , asset sales and the associated ine¢ ciency increase strictly with .
 In some cases, the outcome is e¢ cient only if competition is intense enough:  2
(0; 1).
The intuition for the existence of a threshold  is as follows. Bank B does not acquire
assets when E (A)  pHRb. Since E (A) decreases with , a threshold  exists such
that asset sales occur only if  > . If pHRb > XA, there will be asset sales if Bank B
is certain to make an o¤er ( = 1) and therefore  < 1. If pH(R   Rb)    > XB, no
assets are sold if Bank B cannot make an o¤er ( = 0) and therefore  > 0.
The intuition for the fraction of Bank As assets sold increasing with  (for  > ) is
as follows. When  increases, Banks As reservation payo¤ E (A) decreases. Therefore,
Bank B must transfer less value to Bank A. Once Bank A has exhausted its borrowing
capacity, it must start selling assets to Bank B even though this is ine¢ cient, as this is
the most e¤ective means of transferring value to Bank B (Assumption 1).
12
Our analysis (Corollary 1) shows that the market power of liquid banks can lead to an
ine¢ cient allocation of liquidity even in situations where the allocation would be e¢ cient
if those same banks were perfectly competitive. This scenario corresponds to  >  > 0.
There are also situations in which frictions in the interbank market (here, moral hazard
in monitoring) would lead to an ine¢ cient allocation of liquidity even if liquid banks
were perfectly competitive. This corresponds to  = 0. In those situations, liquid
banksmarket power increases the ine¢ ciency of the allocation of aggregate liquidity. It
is important to stress that market power alone would not lead to an ine¢ cient outcome.
Indeed, absent moral hazard in monitoring, Bank B would be able to increase its interest
rate without a¤ecting the value of Bank As asset. It would nd it optimal to do so since
Bank As assets are bank-specic. The reason why Bank Bs market power would not
lead to an ine¢ cient allocation is that we allow its o¤er to Bank A to specify both price
and quantity.
Corollary 2 E¢ ciency (weakly) decreases with the liquidity need  and with Bank Bs
outside option XB, and increases with Bank As outside option XA. Formally, an increase
in ; an increase in XB, and a decrease in XA all have the following e¤ect:
  decreases weakly for  = 1 and strictly for  2 (0; 1).
 For  > , asset sales and the associated ine¢ ciency increase.
The intuition is that by reducing Bank As reservation payo¤ E (A), an increase in
XB or a decrease in XA tilts the bargaining outcome towards Bank Bs interest which
is to acquire more of Bank As loans. If  > , Bank A has exhausted its borrowing
capacity and an increase in  requires it to sell more loans to Bank B. The properties of
 imply those of .
4 Loan characteristics
In this section, we focus on how the specicity of Bank As assets a¤ects the outcome.
We model explicitly the fact that Bank A has access to competitive outside markets for
borrowing and asset sales. We assume that Bank B has an advantage over outsiders both
for using Bank As assets and for lending against them, which we model as follows.
Asset sales: If an outsider owns a loan of Bank A with characteristic , then p = po().
We assume that Bank B has an advantage over outsiders for managing Bank As assets.
That is, banks are special relative to outsiders, e.g., better monitors of small, relationship-
specic loans (e.g., Fama (1985), James (1987), James and Houston (1996)). Moreover,
we assume that those projects for which Bank As advantage over Bank B is the greatest
are also those for which Bank Bs advantage over outsiders is the greatest, i.e., loans
Bank A-specicity and their bank-specicity relative to outsiders are correlated:
po() < pB() and
dpo()
d
>
dpB()
d
: (13)
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Nevertheless, we assume it is e¢ cient to renance Bank As loans even if owned by an
outsider:
po() > =R: (14)
Borrowing: We assume that Bank B is more e¤ective than outsiders at making loans
to Bank A.14 Specically, we assume that when borrowing from outsiders, Bank As
benet from not monitoring is bo  b, so that it must retain a larger exposure to its loans
to have an incentive to monitor, i.e., Rob  bo=p  Rb.
To simplify, we assume again that Bank A can raise more funds by selling outsiders a
loan than by pledging some of its return to them
8 2 [0; 1] ; po()R > pH(R Rob):
The outcome is obtained from Proposition 1 by replacing Bank Bs characteristics
with the outsiders, i.e., by setting XB = 0, b = bo and pB = po. The intuition is therefore
similar. If Bank As borrowing capacity pH (R Rob) exceeds its funding need , Bank A
should only borrow from outsiders as this is more e¢ cient. Otherwise, it must sell some
assets to outsiders.
Lemma 1 If bargaining between banks A and B breaks down, the outcome is as follows.
 If pH(R   Rob)     0, the outcome is e¢ cient: Bank As funding needs are met
entirely by borrowing from outsiders and no asset sale (i.e. o = 0). Bank As expected
payo¤ is
XA = pHR  : (15)
 Otherwise, the outcome is ine¢ cient: Bank A sells a fraction o = 1  F (o) of its
assets to outsiders with o dened by
1Z
o
[po()R  pH(R Rob)] dF () =   pH(R Rob); (16)
14Peer monitoring among banks is considered important because interbank loans are large and unse-
cured (see Rochet and Tirole (1996), and Freixas and Holthausen (2005) for theory and Furne (2001)
and Cocco et al. (2005) for evidence). Also, interbank lending relationships are seen to mitigate agency
problems. Furne (2001) and Cocco et al. (2005) suggest that large banks, in terms of size as well as par-
ticipation in interbank lending, enjoy market power in lending: they borrow and lend at more favorable
terms, and often small banks, with limited access to foreign interbank markets, concentrate all their bor-
rowing in the domestic interbank markets relying on a few lending relationships with large banks. Cocco
et al. also highlight the essentially bilateral nature of interbank lending: most of the lending volume is
accounted for by direct loans where loan amount and interest rate are agreed on a one-to-one basis
between borrower and lender, other banks do not necessarily have access to the same terms and may
not even observe the transaction, and posted quotes are merely indicative. The bilateral nature of the
market is also evidenced in that the identity of lending banks a¤ects the interest rate. Cocco et al. nd
that banks with higher return on assets lend at higher interest rates, more protable banks lend less.
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while the remaining assets are renanced with the sales proceeds and a loan from outsiders.
In that case, Bank As payo¤ is
XA = pHR   
1Z
o
[pH   po()]RdF (): (17)
We can now analyze bargaining between banks A and B. For now, we assume that
Bank Bs outside optionXB is independent of Bank As distribution of loan characteristics
F . Recall that Bank A sells all its loans with  above . This threshold does depend on
the distribution of loan characteristics. Hence the fraction  of its assets Bank A sells
to Bank B depends on F directly but also through its e¤ect on .
Proposition 3 E¢ ciency increases with the outsidersability to monitor loans to Bank
A, with their ability to run assets, and with the redeployability of Bank As assets. More
precisely, for  > , a decrease in bo, an increase in the function po () or a shift of the
distribution F towards higher values in the sense of FOSD results in fewer asset sales and
a lower ine¢ ciency.
The e¤ect of a decrease in bo or an increase in po() is simple. Indeed, such changes
increase XA but keep all other variables constant. Therefore, this result is a simple
implication of Corollary 2. The e¤ect of a shift of F is more complex as it a¤ects not only
Bank As outside option in its bargaining with Bank B but also other variables relevant
to that bargaining.
Our analysis implies that the market failure in the transfer of liquidity is more severe
when banks that need liquidity have a large share of their portfolio in small, relationship-
specic loans, as this decreases the outside option of needy banks, giving surplus banks a
better opportunity to exert market power and exploit needy banksdi¢ culties.
5 Central bank as lender-of-last-resort
We have shown how surplus banksmarket power can worsen or even create ine¢ ciencies
in the interbank market. An important implication is that an aggregate liquidity surplus
is no guarantee that liquidity will nd its way to banks needing it most in an e¢ cient way.
In this context, we study how a central bank acting as a lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) can
mitigate ine¢ ciencies by curbing surplus banksability to exploit their market power. We
also determine the conditions under which such an improvement occurs.
Note that our analysis side-steps the issue of the central banks optimal policy. Here,
we focus only on ex-post e¤ects of central bank intervention. However, central bank ac-
tions can a¤ect bank behavior ex ante, e.g., lead to moral hazard and mismanagement
of liquidity and credit risk (Repullo (2005) and Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2007)).
We also do not analyze optimality of the intervention from ex-post or ex-ante standpoint.
Indeed our model as it stands is ill-suited for such an analysis as it does not specify
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explicitly the limits to central bank intervention. Hence, taking the model literally, the
central bank could forcethe e¢ cient allocation of liquidity by setting directly the liq-
uidity transfers between banks. For instance, it could set caps on interest rates and oors
on asset prices. In practice, several problems might make such direct intervention less
e¤ective and a meaningful analysis of optimal regulation should account for these.
We amend the model as follows. If bargaining with Bank B breaks down, Bank A can
rst seek liquidity from from a central bank and then from competitive outside markets.15
When borrowing from the central bank, Bank As benet from not monitoring is bC , and
we dene RCb  bC=p. We assume that Bank B is better than the central bank at
making loans to Bank A, i.e., bC  b. To simplify, assume that the central bank has full
bargaining power against Bank A. We assume that ex post, the central bank maximizes
social surplus subject to its expected losses not exceeding some level   0.
Finally, denote o the value of 
 absent any intervention by the central bank. If
 < o, the e¢ cient outcome is reached, i.e., Bank A does not sell any of its loans and
renances them all. In that case, there is no role for the central bank. Instead, we now
assume that  > o and study the e¤ect of central bank acting as a LOLR.
5.1 Central bank intervention
We discuss the form of the central banks ex post optimal intervention. Since the central
bank is, up to a limit, willing to extend some potentially loss-making loans, it would be
willing to make a transfer to Bank A of up to , or a larger transfer against some claim
on Bank As assets.
Proposition 4 The central banks optimal intervention depends on whether it is better
than outsiders at monitoring Bank A.
 If it is not (i.e., bC  bo), its optimal intervention amounts to a pure transfer to
Bank A
TC = min f;   pH (R Rob)g : (18)
Bank A should borrow pH (R Rob) from outsiders and sell them the remaining loans if
any.
 If it is (i.e., bC < bo), its optimal intervention amounts to lending to Bank A and
possibly making it a pure transfer
LC = pH(R RCb ) and TC = min

;   pH
 
R RCb
	
: (19)
Bank A should not borrow from outsiders, only sell them the remaining loans if any.
 In both cases, as the central banks maximum expected loss  increases, asset sales
decrease.
15For simplicity, we assume that the central bank cannot buy Bank As assets. The central bank owning
assets could correspond to nationalization of some or all of Bank As assets.
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Consider rst the case of a central bank that is no better than outsiders at monitoring
loans to Bank A. In that case, loans should be made only by outsiders, i.e., the central
bank should not use Bank As limited borrowing capacity. Moreover, outsiders being
competitive, they make zero prots and so there is no action by the central bank that can
induce them to extend more loans. Hence the central banks actions do not a¤ect Bank As
borrowing capacity. The only action the central bank can take is to make (what amounts
to) a pure transfer to Bank A. Such a transfer can be implemented in di¤erent ways: a
pure transfer, or possibly a guarantee of Bank As debt towards outsiders. Importantly,
however, the central bank should not receive claims on Bank As cash ows as outsiders
value these more.
Consider now the case of a central bank that is better than outsiders at monitoring
loans to Bank A. This advantage may, for instance, stem from the central banks supervi-
sory role. In that case, it should substitute itself to outsiders, i.e., the outsiders should not
use Bank As limited borrowing capacity. The central bank increases Bank As borrowing
capacity, which eventually reduces the need for ine¢ cient asset sales.
There is no room for collateral or secured lending as such in our model. However, the
central banks potential loss maps e¤ectively into a liquidity transfer, which in turn can
be interpreted as lowering the quality of collateral against which the central bank extends
liquidity support, e.g., by lending to needy banks against mortgages at a higher rate than
the market does if these loans are likely to be terminated in absence of liquidity support.
For a given bC , dene  (K; bC) as the level of potential losses the central bank must
incur to achieve e¢ ciency loss no greater than K.
Corollary 3 If the central bank is better than outsiders at monitoring Bank A (i.e.,
bC < bo), the expected loss it must incur to achieve a given level of e¢ ciency decreases
with its ability to monitor Bank A, i.e.,
@ (K; bC)
@bC
> 0: (20)
As bC decreases, Bank A can pledge a larger fraction of its return to the central bank
so that loss-making loans are less costly to the central bank. Or, in other words, through
its supervisory role, the central bank can limit its losses.
5.2 Impact on interbank market outcomes
We can now study how the possibility of central bank intervention ex post a¤ects the
bargaining between banks A and B ex ante. As a benchmark, consider a central bank
that is neither better than outsiders at monitoring Bank A nor willing to accept any
potential losses.
Proposition 5 A central bank that is no better than outsiders at monitoring Bank A
(i.e., bC  bo) and/or is not ready to accept any potential losses (i.e.,  = 0) cannot
ameliorate the ine¢ ciency arising from Bank Bs market power.
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The intuition is simple. Indeed, if the central bank is able and willing to take a given
action, so is any of the outsiders. In e¤ect, the central bank is like an outsider, possibly
one that is less e¤ective at extending loans. Hence, Bank As outside option is the same
as absent the central bank and the outcome of its negotiation with Bank B is unchanged.
Turning the result on its head, we can characterize situations in which central bank
intervention can have an impact.
Proposition 6 The central bank can improve outcomes if it is better than outsiders at
monitoring Bank A (i.e., bC  bo) and/or is ready to accept potential losses (i.e.,  > 0).
Moreover, loans sales and the associated ine¢ ciency decrease with the central banks ability
to monitor Bank A (if it exceeds that of outsiders) and with its willingness to make losses,
i.e., 
@
@bC

> 0 and

@
@

< 0: (21)
The central bank can improve outcomes without actually extending loans in equilib-
rium, i.e., it can play a virtual and virtuousrole: It is su¢ cient that it provides potential
competition to Bank B. By acting as a LOLR, the central bank can improve Bank As
outside option in its negotiation with Bank B, provided that the central bank is either
better than outsiders at monitoring Bank A or willing to extend loss-making loans.16
We nd that unless the central bank is a more e¤ective lender than outsiders, its
loans would have to be potentially loss-making. This in turn raises several issues: (i)
if the central bank stands as a LOLR, it will have incentives to improve its ability to
make loans, e.g., to assess and monitor borrowing banks; and (ii) it may be optimal to
assign other tasks (e.g., supervision) to the central bank if they increase its expertise in
monitoring loans. This argument di¤ers from that saying that since the central bank is a
LOLR, it ought to supervise/monitor banks to avoid that they be in a position to need
the LOLR.
6 Ex-ante liquidity insurance
So far, we have considered liquidity transfers once a liquidity shock has occurred, ignoring
the possibility for banks to insure against such shocks as considered by Bhattacharya and
Gale (1987), Allen and Gale (2000), and Leitner (2005), among others. We now consider
the possibility for Bank A to insure, completely or partially, against liquidity shocks. We
modify the model as follows.
16Berger et al. (2000) test the hypothesis that supervisors have more accurate information than the
market on the soundness of nancial institutions using data from the US. They show that shortly after
supervisors have inspected a bank, supervisory assessment of the bank is more accurate than the market.
However, for periods where the supervisory information is not up-to-date, the market has more accurate
information than supervisors.
Note that our results would be stronger if we allowed the central bank to be more e¢ cient than other
banks in monitoring. However, what we derive is a stronger result as we show that even a central bank
that is not necessarily as e¢ cient as other banks in monitoring can decrease the ine¢ ciency in liquidation.
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At t = 0, Bank A can approach Bank B to organize liquidity insurance. We do not
consider the possibility for Bank A to get liquidity insurance from outsiders. This appears
to be consistent with banks being special in provision of lines of credit, not just to other
borrowers in the economy but also to each other. Also, for simplicity, we assume that
Bank A makes Bank B a take-it-or-leave it o¤er.
At t = 1, Bank As loans need renancing of  units of cash with probability x, and
no renancing otherwise. Whether Bank A incurs a liquidity shock or not is veriable.
If Bank A incurs a liquidity shock, Bank Bs opportunity cost of capital is  > 1 with
probability y and 1 otherwise. We assume that pHR  < 0, i.e., if Bank Bs opportunity
cost is high, e¢ ciency requires that Bank B does not transfer funds to Bank A. We assume
that Bank Bs opportunity cost of capital is not veriable. At that point, banks A and
B can renegotiate their contract.
Finally, we make simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that all of Bank As loans
have the same characteristic .17 Second, we assume that Bank B cannot pledge any of
its assets to Bank A. This ensures that if Bank B makes a transfer to Bank A but turns
out to have a high cost of capital, Bank A will not transfer back the appropriate amount
of liquidity to Bank B. Third, we assume that Bank B has full bargaining power at the
contract renegotiation stage (i.e.,  = 1). Fourth, we assume that outside markets are
so weak that only Bank B can renance Bank As loans, i.e., any loan not renanced by
Bank B must be terminated.
There are three states of the world. In principle, Bank As o¤er species for each state
of the world three components per state of the world ! 2 f(; 1) ; (; ) ; (0; 1)g a transfer
T (!) from Bank B to Bank A, a set of loans of measure  (!) transferred to Bank B,
and a claim r (!) by Bank B on Bank As remaining assets. However, the fact that Bank
Bs cost of capital is not observable constrains the set of feasible contracts at t = 0. In
can be shown that the contracts terms cannot di¤er across states (; 1) and (; ).
Proposition 7 An optimal contract at t = 0 is as follows.18 Dene
T   (1  x) pH (R Rb) 
x

(1  y) (pBR  pH (R Rb)) + yRbR 
 : (22)
 If T   , Bank A gets full liquidity insurance from Bank B so that no loans is sold
to Bank B in the event of a liquidity shock, i.e., T () = .
 If T  < , Bank A gets only partial liquidity insurance from Bank B, i.e.,
T () = T : (23)
If Bank A incurs a liquidity shock, Bank B acquires a fraction  of Bank As loans with
 = 1  T


: (24)
17With heterogeneous values of , the optimal contract would generally involve some asset sale to Bank
B even when Bank A does not incur a liquidity shock. Indeed, the sale of more liquid loans absent a
shock could avoid the sale of less liquid loans in the event of a shock.
18This contract is not uniquely optimal. Indeed, a contract with some asset sales when there is no
shock and less sales when there is a shock can also be optimal.
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Corollary 4 The fraction of loans Bank A sells following a liquidity shock, and the as-
sociated ine¢ ciency increase with the probability x of a liquidity shock for Bank A, the
probability y that Bank Bs cost of capital is high, and with the value of Bank Bs high
cost of capital .
In other words, as a shock becomes more likely, there is less scope for liquidity insur-
ance. As y and/or  increase, Bank B is less keen to commit to a transfer to Bank A.
The implication of this is that when aggregate liquidity shortage is more likely, there is
less insurance written ex ante. In turn, even if the aggregate liquidity shortage does not
arise, the surplus banks are left with greater ability to exploit their market power against
cash-stricken banks. Finally, another implication of the proposition is that as long as
only partial liquidity insurance is obtained in equilibrium, the central bank can improve
e¢ ciency by acting as a lender of last resort.
7 Robustness and discussion
Before proceeding to discuss in greater detail the implications of our model and results for
central banks role as lender of last resort, we discuss some theoretical issues concerning
their robustness.
7.1 Asymmetric information
Asymmetric information is an important alternate candidate that can result in a failure
of inter-bank markets (Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), Flannery (1996), and Freixas and
Jorge (2007)). While it is di¢ cult to resolve theoretically which one of asymmetric in-
formation and moral hazard is the more important driver of limited liquidity, our model
suggests that the role of central banking in the two cases is likely to be quite di¤erent.
For instance, in a model with asymmetric information, a central bank not prepared to
make losses on its loans can help ex post only if it is a better monitor of needy banks
relative to surplus banks. In our model in contrast, the central bank can help even if it is
worse than surplus banks in monitoring needy banks as long as it is better than outsiders.
Further, with asymmetric information, the central bank will in equilibrium lend to needy
banks in order to improve ex post outcomes, unless it can credibly convey its information
to surplus banks. In our model, the central bank need not lend in equilibrium; that is,
it can play a virtual and virtuous role as its mere credibility as a lender of last resort
weakens surplus banksbargaining power.
7.2 Market power relative to outsiders
While altering the order of bargaining between surplus and needy banks does not a¤ect
results substantially, the nature of market power of the surplus bank with respect to
outsiders raises interesting questions. First, how would outcomes be a¤ected if the surplus
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bank has better lending power but the outside markets to sell assets are associated with
better asset management skills? Is the conuence of market power of the surplus bank in
both lending and asset sale markets necessary for ine¢ ciency asset sales to arise? While we
have not analyzed this case formally, we conjecture that the answer to the latter question
is in the a¢ rmative.
Second, under the model assumptions, outsiders have incentives to supervise banks
and assume some of the roles of the regulator since there are rents to be captured from
such monitoring and improved ability to o¤er liquidity to needy banks. One reason
outsiders may not succeed in gaining such a strategic advantage is that banks may be more
forthcoming to disclose information to the regulator, anticipating that such information
will not be used against them competitively, whereas outsiders, who may be (or could in
future become) players in similar markets as banks, may not be credible in not exploiting
such information for their own advantage. The historical evidence in Appendix B of the
competitive behavior of commercial central banks during crises reinforces this point. The
player that reduces the bargaining power of surplus banks must be a non-competitive,
non-prot maximizing institution such as the central bank.
7.3 Market power relative to central bank
Similarly, the nature of game between the surplus bank and the central bank raises im-
portant questions. We showed that the e¤ectiveness of the central bank in curbing the
market power of the surplus bank is increasing in the quality of its supervision (given the
amount of losses the central bank is prepared to su¤er on its loans). We modeled the
quality of supervision as central banks ability to lower the private benets extracted by
the needy bank. However, the central bank knew with certainty that the state was not in
fact one with aggregate liquidity shortage.
Suppose instead that the cost of capital () of the surplus bank is only partially
observed by the central bank. Then, the central bank has limited powers to coerce the
surplus bank into supplying liquidity. It would now have to bargain with the surplus
bank, possibly leaving them with rents.19 We leave aside for now a fuller modeling of this
game.
19The nancial crisis in the UK and the bailout and subsequent nationalization of Northern Rock in
2007 showed that surplus banks can exert power not only on needy banks but also on authorities (see
The Bank loses a game of chicken,Financial Times, 9/20/2007; Lessons of the fall,The Economist,
10/8/2007): On 8/13/2007, Northern Rock approached regulatory authorities in the UK (the Bank of
England, the HM Treasury and the Financial Services Authority) and informed them about its liquidity
problems. By mid-September, the longer-term funding markets were closed for Northern Rock. While the
possibility of Bank of England acting as a lender of last resort had been discussed among the authorities,
the option of selling Northern Rock to another bank had been tried rst. While Lloyds TSB emerged
as a serious contender, the deal did not go through since Lloydsdemand for a loan of up to £ 30 billion
from the Bank of England had been rejected by the tripartite authorities on the grounds that it would
not be appropriate to help nance a bid by one bank for another. The case of Bear Stearnsacquisition
by J.P.Morgan Chase in March 2008 has been much the same, except that the Fed provided a loan of up
to $30 billion for the acquisition (see footnote 6 for details).
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8 Implications for policy and broader nancial mar-
kets
8.1 The discount window
The result that central banks do not lend in equilibrium but merely change needy banks
outside option, forcing surplus banks to adjust their liquidity supply, has implications
for discount windows in central bankslender-of-last-resort facilities and their usage by
banks.
Usually, the discount window (e.g. the US Feds) o¤ers banks a lending facility at a
premium to the federal funds rate, i.e., the rate at which banks (depository institutions)
lend their balances at the Fed to other banks, usually overnight. The discount windows
purpose has been a puzzle to many as it is seldom used. Some have argued that a
bank borrowing from the discount window would be seen as having funding problems in
interbank and other markets, and that this stigma" explains banksreluctance to use
the discount window. Our analysis implies that this reluctance need not mean that the
discount window serves no purpose. The federal funds rate plus the premium sets an upper
bound on the cost of borrowing when aggregate liquidity is in surplus. In particular, this
limits the rents surplus banks can squeeze out of needy banks.
A second implication concerns the discount window premium. How high should the
premium be? Could it be so high that it has little e¤ect on borrowing outcomes?20 Lack
of borrowing at the discount window by itself should not cause as much alarm as lack
of any e¤ect of changing the premium at the discount window on interbank borrowing
rates, an issue that has not received signicant attention. In the context of our model,
the discount window would have no e¤ect on borrowing outcomes if the lending rate at
the window is not below that at which outside (non-bank) markets would lend against the
same assets. Indeed, the central bank may nd it desirable to commit to bearing some
potential losses in which case the e¤ective lending rate at the window should be below the
outside market rate. Historically, there has been some evidence of such use of discount
window at discount to federal funds rate (rather than at premium) having been e¤ective
during the 1970 Penn Central commercial paper crisis.21
20For example, in August 2007, the Fed cut the discount rate to just a half percentage point above
the federal funds rate, from the usual spread of a full point, hoping to encourage banks to seek funds
from the window to help customers nance holdings of illiquid securities. Fed o¢ cials told banks at the
time that any such borrowing would be seen as a sign of strength, not weakness. This change did not
lead to a big increase in borrowing . . . (because) even at a (half point) spread, the (discount) rate was
higher than the rate on alternative sources of funds for most depository institutions,William Dudley
(Executive Vice President), who managed open market operations at the New York Fed at that time,
told an audience at the Philadelphia Fed in October 2007.
21Calomiris (1994) describes the crisis, and the Feds use of the discount window to combat it. The
Fed lent to member banks through the discount window for purposes of making loans to commercial
paper issuers. Importantly, funds were lent at a discount to the federal funds rate, rather than the
normal premium, which succeeded in channeling liquidity to needy institutions reliant on commercial
paper market during normal times. Firms likely to have had outstanding debt in the form of commercial
paper su¤ered larger negative abnormal returns during the onset of the crisis, and larger positive ones
after the Fed intervened to lower the cost of commercial paper rollover.
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It is an important consideration as to whether central bank needs to lend to individual
institutions or can succeed in channeling liquidity to needy banks simply through open
market operations (OMO) (Goodfriend and King, 1988). Our model implies that when
there are market power issues, the central bank operations through OMOsmay not succeed
in their objective or the central bank may need to pump very large amounts of liquidity
to break the market power of some banks. Consistent with this view, during the hearings
about the Northern Rock episode in Fall of 2007, Governor of Bank of England Mervyn
King and the Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling pointed out the di¢ culties
with OMOs in channeling liquidity to needy banks as the primary reason for lending
directly to individual institutions. In particular, they pointed out that to channel the £ 14
billion Northern Rock borrowed from the Bank of England to that institution would have
required many more billions of pounds to be injected through the OMOs.
8.2 New forms of central bank funding
Our analysis also implies that unless outside markets are themselves strapped of liquidity,
needy banks should have no trouble raising liquidity against collateral requiring little
monitoring skills or expertise. Illiquidity issues arise for those loans over which other
banks have an advantage in terms of monitoring and usage, conferring upon them market
power during crises. Indeed, collateral that is highly bank-specic may be ine¢ ciently
liquidated. Hence, a discount window or other lender-of-last-resort facility that lends only
against high-quality collateral may not improve much the allocation of liquidity among
banks.
This perspective is useful for understanding the new facilities set up by the Fed in
2007-09 aimed at channeling liquidity to the most needy corners of the nancial system.
These new facilities have extended maturities to include up to 90-day loans, maturities
at which money markets have dried up in the aftermath of sub-prime losses; extended
eligible collateral to include investment-grade debt securities (including high-rated but
illiquid mortgage-backed securities); and, extended these privileges to not just banks but
also to securities dealers since these are also a¤ected by funding problems due to drying
up of liquidity extension from banks.22 These changes are more likely to be e¤ective
than traditional facilities in restoring liquidity of interbank markets, even if they are not
22In particular, in addition to the traditional tools the Fed uses to implement monetary policy (e.g.,
Open Market Operations, Discount Window, and Securities Lending program), new programs have been
implemented since August 2007: 1) Term Discount Window Program (announced 8/17/2007) - extended
the length of discount window loans available to institutions eligible for primary credit from overnight
to a maximum of 90 days; 2) Term Auction Facility (TAF) (announced 12/12/2007) - provides funds to
primary credit eligible institutions through an auction for a term of 28 days; 3) Single-Tranche OMO
(Open Market Operations) Program (announced 3/7/2008) - allows primary dealers to secure funds for
a term of 28 days. These operations are intended to augment the single day repurchase agreements
(repos) that are typically conducted; 4) Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) (announced 3/11/2008)
- allows primary dealers to pledge a broader range of collateral than is accepted with the Securities
Lending program, and also to borrow for a longer term  28 days versus overnight; and, 5) Primary
Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) (announced 3/16/2008) - is an overnight loan facility that provides funds
directly to primary dealers in exchange for a range of eligible collateral; 6) Commercial Paper Funding
Facility (CPFF) (announced 11/7/2008) - is designed to provide a liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of
commercial paper; 7) Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) (announced 11/21/2008) - is
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directly tapped into, since they have created a direct option for raising funding against
assets rendered illiquid.23
In the early stages of the crisis of 2007-2009, the Federal Reserve used open market
operations to ease the strain in money markets. While OMOs had some success in sta-
bilizing the overnight rate, the rates on term loans continued to rise. On December 12,
2007, the Federal Reserve introduced the Term Auction Facility (TAF), which provides
term funding to eligible depository institutions through auctions. McAndrews et. al.
(2008) analyze whether TAF had success in easing the strain in money markets, mea-
sured as downward shifts in LIBOR. They show that the introduction of TAF had been
successful, where a cumulative reduction of 50 basis points in the LIBOR-OIS spread can
be associated with the TAF announcements and its operations (also see Wu (2008)).
Furthermore, during the crisis, we observed extended maturities and a broader range
of collateral accepted by many central banks. William Buiter provides a rationale for this
by criticizing Bank of Englands approach in the early days of the crisis for its very strict
collateral requirements: Basically, they would discount only stu¤ that is already liquid:
UK government securities; European Economic Area government securities; a few inter-
national organizationsdebt like the World Bank; and then under special circumstances,
US Treasury bonds. All that stu¤ is liquid already.
8.3 Moral suasion
Outside of the scope of our model, but of relevance to its conclusions, is the role of
central banks beyond that of LOLR. Much like the constraints of the IMF in dealing
with the 80sLDC debt crisis, in most serious cases of nancial crises, central banks do
not have su¢ cient resources to be able to deal with the crisis out of their own funds or
expertise to nationalize a large part of the nancial sector. Hence, central bank funding in
rescue packages is often tied with private-sector funding as well as ownership of rescued
institutions, either by a single private player or a consortium. Such quasi-regulatory
support operations are likely to be e¤ective only if done with leadership, guidance and
moral suasion of a central bank that must impress upon prot-maximizing private players
the need to coordinate an outcome that balances their prot objectives with broader
welfare concerns.
The crucial feature necessary to allow a central bank to carry out this function is
that it should be above the competitive battle, a noncompetitive, non-prot-maximizing
body. The success of the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) rescue in 1998 with
a consortium of bankers, and the expedient resolution of Bear Stearnsdistress through
a sale to J.P.Morgan Chase in March 2008, both at initiatives of the Fed, point to the
aimed to support a private-sector initiative designed to provide liquidity to U.S. money market investors;
8) Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) (announced 11/25/2008) - is designed to help
market participants meet the credit needs of households and small businesses by supporting the issuance
of asset-backed securities (ABS) collateralized by auto loans, student loans, credit card loans etc.
23Acharya and Backus (2009) point out, however, that given potential solvency concerns about bor-
rowing banks, such lender of last resort might need to be combined with solvency-linked covenants, as in
private lines of credit that banks write for their borrowers.
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importance of this coordination role of central banks.
9 Conclusion
We proposed in this paper that during crises and more generally when distribution of
liquidity among banks is highly skewed, surplus banks may not lend e¢ ciently to needy
banks due to the strategic gains to be made upon the closure of troubled banks or upon
the liquidation of their assets. This problem was shown to be more acute the weaker the
market for assets outside of the banking sector, a scenario that would arise, for instance,
in liquidation of opaque and information-sensitive assets and relationship-specic loans
made to small borrowers.
Such strategic behavior describes well crises in the pre-Fed era and provides a rationale
for the existence of the central bank. A central bank that is credible in providing liquidity
to banks in need at competitive rates, can eliminate the bargaining power of surplus banks
in the interbank market and thereby restore the e¢ ciency of liquidity transfers and asset
sales. This lender-of-last-resort rationale for the existence of a central bank complements
the traditional one pertaining to times of aggregate liquidity shortages and contagious
failures. Our model illustrates that the public provision of liquidity can improve its
private provision even when aggregate liquidity is in surplus. More broadly, our model also
provides a rationale for central banks to play the role of coordinating liquidity injection
to needy institutions, if required, through moral suasion.
Our analysis can be extended in several directions. On the modeling front, perhaps
one limitation of our model is that the structure of liquidity shocks is exogenous. It would
be useful to endogenize this based on the optimal liability structure of banks (Diamond
and Rajan (2001), Acharya and Viswanathan (2009)). In particular, how do issues of
market power and the resulting under-provision of liquidity insurance a¤ect the optimal
asset-liability (mis)match and liquidity management by banks?
Another limitation is that we take the structure of inter-bank relationships and market
power as given. Is there market power of some form that arises naturally due to inter-bank
relationships that are e¢ cient from an ex-ante perspective. What is the ex-ante industrial
organization design that is optimal for inter-bank markets? In particular, does it feature
tiering" where some large banks hoard reserves and acquire rents during crises, and
others remain smaller, less liquid players, borrowing from large banks, but get squeezed
during crises? Answering these questions in future work remains an important research
agenda as analysis of e¢ cient central bank interventions from an ex-ante perspective must
be undertaken in such a richer setup.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Setting r = R Rb is weakly optimal since Bank A can always
compensate an increase in r with an o¤setting increase in T . Bank Bs participation
constraint is binding since otherwise, Bank A can always increase T . Hence, we have:
T = F (^)pH(R Rb) +
1Z
^
[pB()R  ] dF () XB: (25)
Substituting, we can write Bank As problem as:
max
^
^R
0
pHRdF () +
1R^

pB()RdF ()   XB
s:t: F (^)pH(R Rb) +
1R^

[pB()R  ] dF () XB   F (^)  0
(26)
Since pH > pB() for all  2 (0; 1), the objective increases in ^. Note that condition (6)
the constraint is satised for ^ = 0. Moreover, its LHS decreases with ^ (Assumption 1).
If the constraint holds for ^ = 1, i.e., if pH(R Rb)    XB, then A = 1. Note that in
this outcome, Bank A borrows more than the funds needed to renance all its loans, i.e.,
T A > . This outcome is equivalent to (among others) Bank A borrowing exactly T

A = 
against a debt claim rA = (XB + ) =pH . Otherwise, it is optimal to set 

A at the point
where it binds, i.e., T A = F (

A) and 

A is as in (9).
Proof of Proposition 2: Setting r = R Rb is weakly optimal since Bank B can always
compensate an increase in r with an o¤setting increase in T . Since Bank A can always
increase T , one of the other two constraints must bind. Hence Bank Bs problem can be
written as:
max
^;T
^R
0
pH(R Rb)dF () +
1R^

[pB()R  ] dF ()  T
s:t: T = F (^)+max
n
E (A)  F

^

pHRb; 0
o
:
(27)
If E (A) > F

^

pHRb, the objective becomes:
^Z
0
pHRdF () +
1Z
^
pB()RdF ()    E (A) (28)
which increases with ^, i.e., F 0(^)

pHR  pB(^)R

> 0.
If E (A)  F

^

pHRb for ^ = 1, i.e., if E (A)  pHRb, then  = 1. This implies
T  =  + E (A)   pHRb. Note that in this outcome, Bank A borrows more than the
funds needed to renance all its loans, i.e., T  > . This outcome is equivalent to (among
others) Bank A borrowing T  =  against a debt claim r = R  E (A) =pH .
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If E (A) < pHRb, it may be that E (A) < F

^

pHRb, in which case the objective
is:
^Z
0
pH(R Rb)dF () +
1Z
^
pB()RdF ()  : (29)
From Assumption 1, this objective decreases with ^, i.e., F 0(^)

pH(R Rb)  pB(^)R

<
0. In that case,  such that E (A) = F (
)pHRb is optimal.
Proof of Corollary 1:  = 0 if and only if E (A)  pHRb. Expressions (6) and (9)
imply A > XA. Hence, @E (A) =@ < 0. The condition holds for  = 0 if
pH(R Rb)    XB; (30)
and is violated for  = 1 if  < 1, i.e., if
pHRb > XA: (31)
Note that under (6), (30) and/or (31) must hold. When both hold,  2 (0; 1). When only
(30) holds,  = 1. When only (31) holds,  = 0. For  > ,  = F 1 (E (A) =pHRb)
which is strictly decreasing with E (A) which is itself strictly decreasing with .
Proof of Corollary 2: For  2 (0; 1), the threshold  is given by E (A) = pHRb with
E (A) = A + (1  )XA and A = pHRbF (A). Therefore
 = min

1;max

0; 1  pHRb  XA
pHRbF (

A) XA

: (32)
By inspection @=@XA < 0. For 
 2 (0; 1), the derivative w.r.t. XB of the denominator
D is
@D
@XB
=

@A
@XB

@D
@A

=  

@A
@XB

pHRbF
0(A) > 0: (33)
Similarly, if  > , we have E (A) = pHRbF (
) which can be rewritten as
pHRbF (
) = XA + (1  ) pHRbF (A) :
The LHS increases with  while we have
@RHS
@XA
=  > 0
@RHS
@A
= (1  ) pHRbF 0 (A) > 0
@RHS
@
=

@RHS
@A

@A
@

< 0
@RHS
@XB
=

@RHS
@A

@A
@XB

< 0
These together with @

@ < 0 and
@K
@ < 0 complete the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3: For  > , we must be in the second case of Lemma 1.
Consider rst the e¤ect of bo. In the second case, we have
@o
@Rbo
=
pHF (

o)
  (po()R  pH(R Rob))
(34)
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which is negative since o is the largest solution to (16). Moreover,
@XA
@o
= (pH   po(o))RF 0(o) > 0: (35)
Hence @XA
@Rbo
< 0, implying @XA
@bo
< 0. The implications for  and K are an application of
Corollary 2.
Proof of Proposition 7: Consider state ! = (; 1). Following the transfer T (!),
Bank A can renance a fraction T (!) = of its loans and therefore, its expected payo¤ is
A (!) = pH (R  r (!)) T (!) . Hence Bank Bs best renegotiation o¤er ensures Bank A
that same payo¤, minimizing the fraction 0 of loans sold to Bank B, i.e., (1  0) pHRb =
A (!). (Note that since r (!)  R   Rb, we have (1  0)  T (!) , i.e., Bank B does not
decrease its transfer to Bank A.) Therefore, Bank Bs expected payo¤ is
B (!) = 
0pBR + (1  0) pH (R Rb)   (36)
=

1  (R  r (!))T (!)
Rb

pBR +
(R  r (!))T (!)
Rb
pH (R Rb)   (37)
Consider state ! = (; ). As before, BankAs expected payo¤is A (!) = pH (R  r (!)) T (!) .
Bank Bs best renegotiation o¤er ensures Bank A that same payo¤, minimizing the trans-
fer T 0, which amounts to minimizing the fraction (1  0) of loans retained by Bank A,
i.e., (1  0) pHR = A (!). (Note that since r (!)  0, we have (1  0)  T (!) , i.e.,
Bank B does not increase its transfer to Bank A.) Therefore, Bank Bs expected payo¤
is
B (!) =   (1  0)  =  (R  r (!))T (!)
Rb
:
Consider state ! = (0; 1). It is easily seen that the maximum expected payo¤ the contract
can ensure in this state without asset sales is B (!) = pH (R Rb).
If there is no contract at t = 0, Bank Bs payo¤ is zero in all states except ! = (; 1)
in which it can acquire all of Bank As assets for no transfer and renance them, so that
its expected payo¤ is B = x (1  y) (pBR  ).
The optimal contract chosen by Bank A at t = 0 maximizes T () subject to
(1  x)B (0; 1) + x (1  y)B (; 1) + xyB (; )  B:
This can be rewritten as
T ()  (1  x) pH (R Rb) 
x (R  r ())
h
(1  y) pBR pH(R Rb)
Rb
+ y 
R

i :
The constraint is relaxed when r () is maximized. Therefore it is optimal to set r () =
(R Rb). Given this, the constraint can be rewritten as T ()  T  with T  as in (22).
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Appendix B: Historical and current evidence
This section discusses some of the private arrangements amongst banks to manage liquid-
ity shocks before the modern central banking era, as well as the role of strategic behavior
in their failure, as witnessed during signicant historical episodes (see Freixas et al. (1999)
for a survey).
I) The failure of private coinsurance arrangements
Orchestrated liquidity support operations occurred often in the past. In the US, the
Clearinghouse System assumed a crisis prevention and management role before the estab-
lishment of the Federal Reserve System in December 1913 (e.g. Gorton (1985), Gorton
and Mullineaux (1987), Calomiris and Kahn (1996), Gorton and Huang (2002, 2006)).
The rst clearinghouse, established by the New York City banks in 1853, created an
organized market for exchange between banks. During normal times, clearinghouses per-
formed their service of clearing payments, whereas during crisis periods, they evolved into
an organization that managed the crisis by helping member banks sustain their solvency
and liquidity positions. During such periods, clearinghouses used several methods such
as suspension of payments, equalization of reserves and issuance of clearinghouse loan
certicates to ease the su¤ering of the member banks in distress. The equalization of
reserves, essentially the pooling of all legal reserves of clearinghouse member banks in
an emergency and granting member banks equal access to that pool, eased the liquidity
constraint on banks experiencing runs. Also, clearinghouses issued loan certicates that
were acquired by banks by depositing qualifying assets with the Clearing House Associ-
ation to be used in interbank settlements. These loan certicates prevented costly asset
liquidations and improved a¤ected banks liquidity position. Since they were provided
only when the Clearing House Association decided that the bank had enough assets to
back them up, loan certicates also served the purpose of certifying that the bank was
healthy (Park (1991)).
Such private arrangements and voluntary participation into e¤orts to help distressed
banks worked well at times. However, their e¤ectiveness was hampered by competitive
pressures in the banking industry. In particular, voluntary participation was often di¢ cult
to elicit due to the short-term competitive advantage healthy banks could enjoy during
crises. The Clearinghouse System was eventually brought down early in the 20th century
by the sharp increase in banking competition in New York.
II) 1907 panic in the US
We now discuss the 1907 panic in the US, a salient example in which the private rescue
of distressed banks was hampered by competitive behavior among banks.
i) The role of J.P.Morgan: Sprague (1910)s discussion of the 1907 panic in New York
suggests that the banksinitial reluctance to organize a private rescue of distressed trust
companies might have lain in the fact that other banks were not adversely a¤ected by
trust companiesdi¢ culties or even beneted by attracting their depositors.
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The immediate cause of the panic was the collapse of copper stocks. On October
17, depositors started running on the Mercantile National Bank. The banks president,
Heinze, had tried to corner the stock of United Cooper. Runs spread to banks controlled
by Morse and Thomas, two speculators nancially a¢ liated with Heinze. The New York
Clearing House Association granted assistance to those banks after examining their sol-
vency and forcing Heinze, Morse and Thomas to resign. This action subdued severe runs
on banks.
Trust companies, however, were also experiencing di¢ culties. Depositors, suspicious
about their involvement in speculation, started running on the Knickerbocker Trust Com-
pany on October 21 and on the Trust Company of America on October 23. The New
York Clearing House, an organization of banks, did not extend assistance to the trust
companies. The Knickerbocker was forced to suspend on October 22, and the Trust Com-
pany of America, a solvent institution, had to su¤er runs for two weeks. Eventually, US
Secretary of the Treasury George B. Cortelyou earmarked $35 million of Federal money
to quell the storm. On November 6, New York trust companies, urged by J.P. Morgan,
organized a team of bank and trust executives, redirected money between banks, secured
further international lines of credit, and bought plummeting stocks of healthy corpora-
tions.24 In particular, they raised a $25 million fund for distressed trust companies and
required the Trust Company of America to deposit its shares and assets with a committee
of trust company presidents. Runs on the Trust Company of America and other small
institutions subsided after the resolution.
While J.P.Morgan is credited as having played the role of coordinator and rescuer
of this nancial crisis, several aspects of his involvement suggest strategic behavior and
market power.
First, in 1906 Heinze had acquired Knickerbocker Trust and Morse gained control of
the Bank of North America. Even prior to the 1907 crisis, banking industry leaders, one
being J.P.Morgan, staged a nancial attack on Heinzes Knickerbocker Trust. They felt
threatened by the developing trusts and wished to sway public and congressional opinion
against them.
Second, the banks controlled by Morgan and his associates experienced only minor
di¢ culties in 1907 thanks to their reputation for soundness. According to Sprague (1910,
pages 262-265), while ve banks controlled by Heinze and Morse su¤ered severe deposit
withdrawals, the six strongest clearinghouse banks showed slight gains in deposits. The
delay in leading assistance to the trust companies is thus often perceived to be strategic
on part of the clearinghouse banks.
Third, and most important, Chernow (1990) discusses how J.P. Morgan beneted from
trust companiesdi¢ culties during the 1907 crisis (see pages 126-128). On November 2,
Morgan (nally) organized a rescue package for the distressed Trust Company of America,
Lincoln Trust, and Moore and Schley. Moore and Schley, a speculative brokerage house
that was $25 million in debt, held a big majority stake in the Tennessee Coal and Iron
24Moen and Tallman (2006) conrm that the large New York banks acted as private liquidity providers
using New York Clearing House loan certicates and that this led to di¢ culties in the distribution of
liquidity.
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Company as collateral against loans. If Moore and Schley had to liquidate that stake, it
might collapse the stock market, and Moore and Schleys collapse might in turn pull down
other institutions. To save Moore and Schley, Morgan wanted some benet for himself
and told friends he had done enough and wanted some quid pro quo. He arranged a deal
where US Steel, his favorite creation that could prot from Tennessee Coals huge iron
ore and coal holdings in Tennessee, Alabama and Georgia, would buy Tennessee Coal
stock from Moore and Schley if trust company presidents assembled a $25 million pool
to protect weaker trusts. While the takeover would normally have been impossible for
antitrust reasons, US Steel managed to secure President Roosevelts approval and the
Sherman Antitrust Act was not be used against it. Senator La Follette said bankers
had rigged up the panic for their own prot. Financial analyst John Moody said that
the Tennessee Coal and Irons property had a potential value of about $1 billion, which
conrmed the $45 million distressed price being a steal.25 Later on, Grant B. Schley, head
of Moore and Schley, admitted that his rm could have been rescued by an outright cash
infusion rather than the sale of the Tennessee Coal stock.
The 1907 crisis paved the way for the establishment of the Federal Reserve System
as Senator Aldrich declared: Something has got to be done. We may not always have
Pierpont Morgan with us to meet a banking crisis (Sinclair (1981)).26 The Fed was a
natural response to the realization that control and leadership of the US nancial system
had e¤ectively been outsourced to one private businessman.
ii) Cash hoarding by Citibank: Cleveland and Huertas (1985) discuss the 1893 and
1907 crises and specically the strategy of the National City Bank (which was to become
Citibank) to anticipate crises and to build up liquidity and capital beforehand to benet
from the di¢ culties of its competitors. About the 1907 crisis, they write (page 52):
National City Bank again emerged from the panic a larger and stronger institution.
At the start, National City had higher reserve and capital ratios than its competitors,
and during the panic it gained in deposits and loans relative to its competitors. Stillman
(President) had anticipated and planned for this result. In response to Vanderlips (Vice
President) complaint in early 1907 that National Citys low leverage and high reserve
ratio was depressing protability, Stillman replied: I have felt for sometime that the
next panic and low interest rates following would straighten out good many things that
have of late years crept into banking. What impresses me as most important is to go
into next Autumn (usually a time of nancial stringency) ridiculously strong and liquid,
and now is the time to begin and shape for it... If by able and judicious management we
have money to help our dealers when trust companies have suspended, we will have all
the business we want for many years.27
25While it is hard to assess the true fundamental value, we report from the discussion of this episode
from the book House of Morgan by Ron Chernow (1990), page 128
26Strouse (1999) details how during the crisis, panicked crowds on the streets of Manhattan would stop
to cheer as J.P.Morgan walked past, pu¢ ng at a cigar. So powerful was the House of Morgan - more
powerful in the nancial world than the government - that nobody dared say no to him. The 1907 crisis
was played out in his library amid his collection of books and art. Dozens of nanciers would be in the
room as Morgan told them they had to work collectively. At one point he locked the doors, refusing to
let anyone leave until he had the answer he wanted - at 4am.
27Competitive gains to banks from failures of peers are evident in modern times as well: see Saunders
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III) Evidence from other countries
Other historical episodes seem to conrm a tension exists between the viability of
private arrangements and competition. An important example is the 1893 nancial crisis
in Australia. The Australian banking system, which was relatively unregulated during
the second half of the 19th century with no central bank and no government-provided
deposit insurance, entered a crisis in 1893, when eleven commercial banks failed and
the rest experienced severe runs. At the time, the Associated Banks of Victoria was a
coalition of private banks, just like the Clearing House Association in New York, and had
been initially set up to coordinate and divide the nances of the colonial governments.
Before the crisis, the Associated Banks announced that, if and when the occasion arose,
they would provide nancial assistance to each other (The Economist, 3/25/1893, page
364). However, during the crisis, this arrangement proved ine¤ective when Federal Bank
was allowed to fail without any assistance in January 1893. Pope (1989) suggests that
competitive pressures played a major role in the failure of private arrangements as banks
stood to gain from other banksfailures through increased market shares.
IV) Emergence of modern central banking
It is important to distinguish two possible reasons for the failure of private coin-
surance arrangements: lack of coordination among clearinghouse members (e.g., due to
free-riding)28 and strategic behavior. It appears that the coordination aspect was factored
into the organization of clearinghouses and that it was really market power that led to
their failure.
Timberlake (1984) argues that in US clearinghouses one bank usually assumed the
central administration role for clearing the other member banksaccounts. However, the
fact that the central commercial banks were also competitors had a signicant e¤ect on
the failure of these private arrangements. In particular, a temptation for the central
commercial banks to take the opportunity of a crisis to force a rival out of business by not
providing the loans/assistance that a correspondent could have expected in normal times.
This concern accords well with the case of J.P.Morgans role in 1907 crisis. Hence, such
conicts of interest create a natural need for a non-competitive, non-prot maximizing
central bank.
Interestingly, early central banks did not take this non-competitive form. In the rst
half of the 19th century, the key feature of a central bank resided in its relationship with
the government and its privileged role as a (monopolistic) note issuer. Importantly, a
central bank was considered to be one of the competitive banks. True central banking
did not develop until the need for the central banks to be noncompetitive had become
realized and established. Bagehot (1873, chapter 7), Goodhart (1985) and Goodhart and
Schoenmaker (1995) report episodes of commercial rivalry between central banks and
(1987) on the 1984 failure of Continental Illinois, Saunders and Wilson (1996) on ight to quality of
depositors during the Depression era, Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1999) on many bank regulatory ac-
tions over 1975-92, Schumacher (2000) also on depositorsight to quality during the 1994-95 Argentinian
crisis, among others. Several of these papers also nd evidence of contagion (Lang and Stulz (1992)).
28Kindleberger (1978), Corrigan (1990), and Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) allude to such a pos-
sibility.
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needy (regular) banks. We summarize some of these below.
Bagehot wrote his famous Lombard Street in 1873 in the aftermath of the Overend
Gurney crash of 1866 when there was suspicion that the unwillingness of the Bank of
England, then a private commercial bank, to support that House was due to commercial
rivalry. Discussing this episode, Bagehot points out that while it was accepted that
the central bank should only assist banks which could expect to be solvent or to regain
solvency under normal conditions, a central bank should seek to act for the public good,
and not simply as a business competitor. In contrast, the Bank of Englands coordination
of the rescue of Baring Brothers in 1890, its organization of a life-boat during the
secondary banking crisis in the early 1970s, and its rescue of Johnson Matthey Bankers
Ltd. in 1984 in response to heightened competition in the nancial sector (Capie et al.
(1994)) are prominent examples of the Bank performing its role in a non-competitive
fashion.
The relation between Banque de France and potential competitors in the mid-19th
century is another good example. In particular, Banque de France used its inuence to
restrict competition from chartered banks. Because of such strong inuence, the Conseil
dEtat was reluctant to grant charters to banks. And in 1867, after being involved in un-
successful real estate speculation, Credit Mobilier experienced di¢ culties and its enemies
at Banque de France took advantage of the situation and forced it into liquidation.
These episodes suggest that while competition issues were not central banks sole
raison dêtre, their modern form non-competitive, non-prot maximizing institutions 
does nd its roots in these issues.
V) Interest-rate behavior during crises in pre- and post-Federal Reserve era
Using US data over 1873-1933, Donaldson (1992) shows that interest rates increased
and stock prices plunged during banking panics. He shows that during panics interest
rates were substantially larger than before crisis (by as much as 500% at times!) and
extremely volatile, which he interprets as evidence of the market power by surplus banks.
He shows that in contrast to the pre-Fed episode, interest rates during crises after the
establishment of the Federal Reserve System were not signicantly di¤erent from the rates
before the crises.
Donaldson also tests whether there was a structural change in the pricing of cash
between panic and non-panic periods. This would be consistent with the thesis that
surplus banks may have used their market power to exploit the di¢ culties of needy banks
during crises. He divides the sample into the pre-Fed (1867-1913) and post-Fed (1914-33)
periods, and conrms that cash was indeed priced during panics at higher than non-panic
rates in the pre-Fed period whereas this was not so in the post-Fed period (Donaldson
(1992), Table 2).29 He concludes that the establishment of the Fed to act as a lender-of-
last-resort during panic periods prevented surplus banks from exerting market power and
29The 1914 panic took place in August. The Federal Reserve System was created via the Federal Act of
23/12/1913 and the Reserve Banks opened for business on 16/11/1914. These dates imply that the 1914
panic took place before the Fed was open. Donaldson (1992), Table 1, covers the behavior of interest
rates between weeks 31-49 of 1914. A careful examination reveals that the interest rates for 1914 are
(slightly) higher than the rates in 1933, which is still consistent with Donaldsons overall argument.
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exploiting needy banks.
VI) Market power around recent hedge-fund failures
In the last ten years, two major hedge funds have collapsed: LTCM in 1998 and
Amaranth in 2006. In both cases, other players in markets seem to have tried to exploit
the fundsdi¢ culties. We discuss both episodes together with some recent studies of such
strategic behavior.
After its remarkable success over 1994-97, LTCM began to experience di¢ culties dur-
ing the nancial turmoil triggered by the Russian default in August 1998. During the
crisis, LTCM had to buy large amounts of Treasury bond futures to unwind its short po-
sition. Anticipating the direction of LTCMs trades and with the advantage of being able
to observe customer order ow, market makers had incentives to engage in front running,
i.e., trading in the same direction knowing that the order will be coming and unwinding
the position afterwards to prot from the orders price impact.
For example, Business Week wrote: ...if lenders know that a hedge fund needs to
sell something quickly, they will sell the same asset, driving the price down even faster.
Goldman Sachs & Co. and other counterparties to LTCM did exactly that in 1998.30
Cai (2003) examines the trading behavior of market makers in the Treasury bond futures
market when LTCM faced binding margin constraints in 1998 and nds that during the
crisis market makers in the aggregate engaged in front running against customer orders
from a particular clearing rm (coded PI7) that closely match features of LTCMs trades
through Bear Stearns. Furthermore, a signicant percentage of market makers made
abnormal prots on most trading days during the crisis.
Eventually, fearing that LTCMs fall might lead to costly disruptions in the nancial
markets, the New York Fed hosted a meeting of fourteen nancial institutions that led to
a private sector recapitalization of LTCM, which relaxed LTCMs constraints and helped
avoid re sales. This, in turn, reversed the protability of speculative trading against
LTCM.
Similarly, the Wall Street Journal reported Amaranth LLCs failure and the e¤orts
of other energy market players to benet from its di¢ culties.31 When the risky bets
Amaranth had taken in the energy market turned out to be unfavorable, it started to lose
value and by the end of Friday, September 15, 2006, was down more than $2 billion from
its August value. The losses prompted J.P. Morgan, Amaranths natural-gas clearing
broker, to raise margin calls to be paid by Monday, September 18. In the past, Amaranth
had met such demands by selling non-energy investments but thinking that some of these
could not be liquidated quickly, Amaranth started negotiations with Wall Street banks to
raise cash. After lengthy negotiations, Amaranth secured a deal with Goldman Sachs that
would require it to pay nearly $1.85 billion to take toxic trades o¤ its hands. Amaranth
intended to use the $1 billion to $2 billion in cash J.P. Morgan held in a margin account,
to pay Goldman Sachs for the deal. However, J.P. Morgan refused to release Amaranths
cash collateral claiming the deal did not free it from the risk that Amaranths trades may
30Business Week, 2/26/2001, The Wrong Way to Regulate Hedge Funds.
31Wall Street Journal, 1/30/2007, Amid Amaranths Crisis, Other Players Proted.
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not get paid. This killed the deal.
Later on, J.P. Morgan got into the game and agreed to jointly assume most of Ama-
ranths energy positions with a partner, Citadel Investment Group. Amaranths total
payments to Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan and Citadel, plus the last few daysmarket losses,
came to about $3.2 billion. While Amaranth su¤ered huge losses during the process, J.P.
Morgan earned an estimated $725 million from the deal. In a speech in November 2006,
Mr. Dimon, J.P. Morgans CEO, said the Amaranth deal produced a very nice incre-
ment to xed-income tradingand in January 2007, RISK magazine named J.P. Morgan
Energy Derivatives House of the Year.
These two episodes illustrate that market for liquidity transfers are often ridden by
strategic behavior by counterparties and lenders, even in the broader landscape of nancial
institutions (not just banks), especially when the stakes are high.
Some recent papers model such strategic behavior. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2005), traders exploit the di¢ culties of other traders facing forced liquidations. If a
distressed large investor must unwind her position, other traders initially trade in the same
direction, and, to benet from the price impact, buy back the same asset. Hence, as in
our model, market participants withdraw liquidity, instead of providing it when liquidity
is most needed. Similarly, Carlin et al. (2007) analyze the breakdown in cooperation
between traders, which manifests itself in predatory trading leading to a liquidity crunch
in the market. In their model, traders cooperate most of the time due to their repeated
interaction and provide liquidity to each other. However, cooperation can break down,
especially when the stakes are high, which leads to predatory trading. While our paper
has similarities with these studies, our model is not exclusively about predatory trading
or the break-down of implicit contracts. It is instead about the ability to exploit market
power in one market (interbank lending market) to benet in other markets (market for
asset sales and product market).
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Figure 1: Timeline of the model. 
t = 0 t = 1 States  
   
 
 
 
 
  
Low ρ  
• Bank A generates the needed liquidity by pledging future 
return.  
 
• No need for (partial) liquidation of Bank A’s portfolio. 
 
 
  
  
• Bank A is hit by a 
liquidity shock of ρ. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
• Bank A makes a risky 
investment. 
 High ρ   
• Bank A cannot generate the needed the liquidity only 
through pledging its future return. 
 
•  Bargaining game between Bank A and Bank B. 
 
• A fraction α of Bank A’s portfolio is sold. 
 
• Potential misallocation cost. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Game tree for the bargaining game. 
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